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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ation act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The court said it has
long been settled that a state may modify or reject the riparian
doctrine and adopt the appropriation system, but in so doing it
must recognize valid and existing vested rights .t Then the federal
tribunal declared, "We do not regard a landowner as having a vest-
ed right in underground waters underlying his land which he has
not appropriated and applied to beneficial use."32
The court also said that even though prior decisions of a state
court have established a rule of property, a departure therefrom in
a subsequent decision does not, without more, constitute a depriva-
tion of property without due process. 3 There is no vested right in
the decisions of a court. They went on to say it is well settled that
a legislature may change the principle of the common law and abro-
gate decisions made thereunder when it is in the public interest. 4
Another Kansas case, dealing with surface waters, earlier upheld
the constitutionality of the Kansas appropriation statutes." They
said here that earlier decisions had been approached on the basis
of individual interest alone. Now they thought it necessary to take
a broader view of the situation and weigh more heavily the public
welfare. The state's highest tribunal claimed unused or unusable
rights predicated alone upon theory become of little if any import-
ance. The court in this case also felt that broad general statements
in earlier decisions must be disregarded or modified to harmonize
with the will of the legislature..
VANCE K. HILL.
RAILROAD, GRANTS, AND CONDEMNATION
Title and Interest Acquired in Railroad Rights-of-Way
I. HISTORY
The concept of land subsidies for the development of the vast
areas of the West was promulgated before the Constitution of the
31. United States v. Rio Grande Darn & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899);
Williams v. City of Wichita, Kansas, 279 F.2d 375, 377 (1960).
32. Baumann v. Smhra at 624. For a discussion of the troublesome question of unused
overlying rights, see Kirkvood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1948). Dean Kirkwood believes that limiting vested rights to those actually used is
legally sound. But see, Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); San
Bernadino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 Pac. 784 (1921); Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water
Co., 154 Cal. 428, 98 Pae. 260 (1908).
33. O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U.S. 20, 26, 27 (191Q).
34. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 264 F. 138, 151 (8th Cir. 1920).
35. State v. Knapp, 165 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949).




United States. Shortly after the confederation was established, the
Ordinance of May 20, 1785, was conceived to determine the mode
of disposing the lands of the Western Territory. It prescribed a
scientific system of identifying land with clear cut boundaries and
titles. Actually, an earlier Ordinance, in 1784, provided for the
artificial division of the entire West, into sixteen districts, eligible
for statehood upon attaining a population of 20,000. This Ordin-
ance was repealed, however, and the Ordinance of 1785 became the
landmark in the orderly development of the United States.
The liberality with which the Congress granted lands to canal
companies in the early seventeenth century prompted railroads to
request like grants to aid in their enterprises. The most prominent
was the Illinois Central in its attempt to connect the Southern part
of the state with the more populous regions. In 1850, when this
railroad was made intersectional - interstate - by an extension to
the Gulf of Mexico, the Congress adopted a measure which gave to
the States of Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama, a right-of-way
through the public lands, and the alternate sections for a distance
of six miles on both sides of the road, or more specifically, 3840
acres of land for every mile of railroad.,
The rapid completion of this railroad led to the settlement of in-
accessible areas and gave rise to immigration and land speculation.
Such success prompted a scramble for land grants by railroad
groups and a number of grants were made from 1850 to 1871. The
most important of these were the famed trans-continentals - the
Union Pacific2 and the Northern Pacific.3 In all, the Northern
Pacific was granted 39 million acres of land to aid in the construc-
tion of the railroad.4  More than one-eighth of all the public do-
main in the United States was granted to the various railroads, a
grand total of 131 million acres of land.'
II. INTERESTS CONVEYED BY PUBLIC GRANTS
In order to determine ownership of oil and gas underlying a rail-
road's right-of-way, it is first necessary to determine what interests
the railroads received from the United States via the grants of the
public domain.
To proceed in a systematic fashion, the term right-of-way de-
serves clarification. Strictly, a right-of-way is the right to pass over
1. 9 Stat. 466 (1850).
2. 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
3. 13 Stat. 365 (1864).
4. 3 Dictionary of American History 237 ,1940) (Land Grants to Railways).
5. Ibid.
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another man's ground, and in applying this right to railroads gen-
erally, it is an easement in the land of others.6 But in practice, the
term has a double significance. It is used to describe a right, be-
longing to a party, of passage over land; also, from the layman's
viewpoint, right-of-way is used to describe that strip of land which
the railroad companies take upon which to construct their roadbed)'
*More specifically, whether or not the materials underlying these
right-of-way grants were given to the railroads depends a great deal
on whether, by the various grants, they took a fee or an easement.
If the grant is to be construed as a determinable fee, the railroad
would apparently have a right to the oil and gas under the right-of-
way, while under an easement construction, the right is either in
the United States or its patentees, the holders of the fee., The cases
supporting the fee concept declared the interest to be a base, limit-
ed, or a qualified fee.' In any event, a right-of-way is a very sub-
stantial thing.
The Iowa Supreme Court in speaking of a railroad's easement
(right-of-way) said that "an easement is not that spoken of in the
old law books, but is peculiar to the use of the railroad which is
usually a permanent improvement, a perpetual highway of travel
and commerce, and will rarely be abandoned by nonuse. The ex-
clusive use of the surface is acquired and damages are assessed on
the theory that the easements will be perpetual so that ordinarily
the fee is of little or no value unless the land is underlaid by a
quarry or mine."'" The property interest acquired in a right-of-way
is corporeal, and if not a fee, than an easement, not an ordinary
easement, but one having the attributes of a fee, perpetuity, and
exclusive use and possession.1' The implications are that the inter-
est created in a railroad's right-of-way lies somewhere between a
qualified fee and an easement. 12
6. Williams v. W. U. By., 50 Wis. 76, 5 N.W. 486 (1880), the court further stated
that "it would be using the term in an unusual sense, by applying it to aq absolute pur-
chase of the fee-simple of lands to be used for a railroad or any other kind of way."
7. See Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1 (1891); Kenner v. Union Pac. By., 31 Fed. 126
(1887).
8. Great No. By. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
9. Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Stalker, 14 Idaho 362, 94 Pac. 56 (1907); a base or
qualified is one which has a qualification subjoined thereto, and which must he determined
whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end, Wiggens Ferry Co. v. Railroad Co.,
94 Ill. 83 (1879); and it may last forever if the contingency does not happen, McIntyre
v. Dietrich, 194 Ill. 126, 128 N.E. 321 (1920). A limited fee denotes present. ownership
of an entire interest in land, an ownership that will continue as long as a stated contin-
gency, leading to a reverter, does not occur, United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S.
112, 130 (1957) (Dissenting Opinion).
10. Smith v. Hall, 103 Ia. 95, 72 N.W. 427 (1897).
11. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171 (1898).
12. MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1941); Denv'er-& S. L By. v.
Pacific Lumber Co., 86 Colo. 86, 278 Pac. 1022 (1929).
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Those cases which hold that a fee passed by the Congressional
grants rely on the premise that the taking by grant was similar to
taking by way of purchase. The consideration inducing the grant
has been said to be the perpetual use of the land for the legitimate
purpose of the railroad.'" A greater degree of reliance is placed on
the fact that a present grant, a qualified fee, was given subject to
the expressed conditions of the Acts and those implied, such as the
railroad shall be used for the purpose designed and that the land
shall revert to the grantor in the event the company ceased to use
or retain the land for the purposes for which it was granted.14
Some cases have held the interest to be a fee without determin-
ing who acquired the right to the minerals underlying the right-of-
way.15 One case went so far as to rule a fee was granted without
making a distinction between a fee and an easement. 6 Other cases
have simply held that the grant did not convey a fee,17 although
the interest acquired has the attributes of a fee for railroad pur-
poses.1"
These cases which support the easement theory rely heavily on
statutory interpretations. In construing the grant under the Act of
March 3, 1875, § 4,19 the Court in Great Northern Ry. v. United
States,2- after stating the requirements of the location of the right-
of-way, said, ...... thereafter all lands over which such right-of-way
shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way. This
reserved right to dispose of lands is wholly inconsistent with the
grant of a fee." The fee or servient estate remained in the United
States. In other words, the act grants an easement only and con-
fers no right to the oil and minerals underlying the right-of-way. 21
13. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 (1902); this ruling would tend to
prohibit the use of the right-of-way for any other purpose for which it was granted, United
States v. Great. No. Ry., 32 F.Supp. 651 (D. 1940).
14. Rio Grande W. Ry. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 (1915); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 (1903); MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1941).
15. Rio Grande W. Ry. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 (1915); Missouri Kan. & Tex. Ry. v.
Roberts, 152 U.S. 144 (1893); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 89 F.Supp. 17 (D.
1919).
16. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 144 (1893).
17. Northern Pac. fy. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 (1903); in construing the effect of
the Act of June 24, 1912, the court said that the ownership of the right-of-way shall have
the samie effect as though the land within the right-of-way was granted absolutely or in fee
as against adverse possessors. Apparently, by implication, the railroad did not take a fee
by the Act of July 1, 12 Stat. 489 (1862), Union Pao. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards, 231
U.S. 190 (1913); but cf. "The Real Property Interest Created In a Railroad Upon Acqui-
sition of Its Right of Way," 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 73 (1954).
18. Midland Valley R.R. v. Corn, 21 F.2d 96 (D. 1927); "A railroad's right-of-way
has the substantiality of a fee and it is private property even to the public in all else hut
an interest and benefit in its uses," Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. R.R., 195 U.S. 530
(1904).
19. 18 Stat. 482 (1875).
20. 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
21. Ibid; In Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490 (1893) and Railroad Co. v. Alling, 99
U.S. 463 (1878) statutory rights-of-way were held to be but easements.
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The Great Northern case overruled earlier decisions which held
that a railroad which took by grant under the Act of 1875 took a
limited fee on an implied condition of reverter in the event the rail-
road should cease to use or retain the land for the purposes for
which it was granted.2 2 The railroad does not have an unrestricted
use of its right-of-way and the owner in fee may use the servient
estate for any purpose not inconsistent with the purposes of the
easement. 23 The lower Courc in the Great Northern case made the
following observations: (1) nothing passes by a public grant ex-
cept what is conveyed in clear and explicit terms, and all rights,
privileges, and immunities not expressly granted are reserved, (2)
the grants of right-of-way over public lands was for the purpose of
constructing, maintaining, and operating the railroad, and property
rights extend upwards for a space necessary for the use of its fran-
chise and downward to a line of support for its tracts and super-
structures, and (3) that grants of public lands in aid of railroads
are to be strictly construed against the grantees, as a grant by the
public to a private company. 24
It is contended that as a result of the great Congressional policy
shift in 1871, the grants prior to this time took a limited fee. 25 The
Great Northern case2 1 in ruling an easement was granted, overruled
the Stringham case 27 which held that the interest acquired was a
limited fee founded upon the grants of 1875, on the basis that this
change in policy was not brought to the court's attention. The
Great Northern case said that such a conclusion is inconsistent
with the language of the act, its legislative history, its early admin-
istration, and the construction by Congress of subsequent legisla-
tion, and for these reasons the Stringham case is not controlling.
The Union Pacific case28 took notice of the policy shift and the
conclusions drawn by the Court in the Great Northern case, but
made a further distinction that none of the "limited fee" cases in-
volved the question of rights to subsurface oil and minerals. The
22. Himonas v. Denver & R. G. W. R.R., 179 F.2d 171 (1949); and see Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Ray, 177 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1949).
23. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Freer, 321 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1958); "The former
proprietor of the soil still retains the fee of the land and his right to the land for every
purpose not incompatable with the rights of the railroad company. Upon discontinuance
or abandonment of the right-of-way, the entire and exclusive property and right of enjoy-
ment revests in the proprietor of the soil." Kansas Cent. Ry. v. Allen, 22 Kans. 225, 31
Am. Rep. 190 (1879).
24. United States v. Great No. Hy., 32 F.Supp. 651 (D. 1940); for other cases in-
volving strict construction of grants see United States v. Denver & C. Ry., 150 U.S. 1
(1893) and Winona & St. Peter Ry. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618 (1885).
25. Great No. Hy. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942); and see generally, 27 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 73 (1954).
26. 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
27. 239 U.S. 44 (1915); and see footnote 14.
28. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
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Court went on to say that "there are no precedents which give the
mineral rights to the owner of the right-of-way as against the
United States. We would make a violent break with history if we
construed the Act of 1862 to give such a bounty. We would indeed,
violate the language of the Act itself." It is apparent then by this
discussion that all mineral lands are reserved to the United States
or its patentees. To strengthen this argument that all mineral lands
are reserved, it can be safely said that there was no intent to include
the mineral lands in the grants of the public lands. The railroads
took the lands for the sole purpose of constructing their lines and
no other.2 9 One cannot acquire a vested interest in a rule of prop-
erty on which he did not rely when he acquired an interest he
seeks to protect.
30
III. POLICY AND MINERAL RESERVATIONS
What was the federal government's policies with regard to min-
eral rights during this period of development? Was there any vari-
ance in this policy toward the right-of-way and the alternate sec-
tions of land granted to aid the construction? In the case of United
States v. Sweet,3 Justice Van Devanter said that by the Ordinance
of May 20, 1785, it is settled policy of Congress to dispose of min-
eral lands only under laws specially including them. During the
period of the great give-away program, the federal policy was to
reserve to the government the mineral lands and not to grant
them. 32 During the period of 1849 through 1866, the government
.wanted to aid the railroad companies in furnishing a link between
the populous East and the unsettled West. Toward the end of this
period, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with this give-
away program which turned over so much of the public domain to
big business. Under public pressures, the policy of granting land
subsidies to the railroads was discontinued in 1871, and crystallized
in a House Resolution in 1872.13 The Act af March 3, 1875,3 4 was
designed to curtail the subsidies but still encourage the develop-
ment of the West by granting to designated railroads simply a
right-of-way through the public land of the United States.35
29. MacDonald v. United States, 199 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1941); Midland Valley R.R.
v. Corn, 21 F.2d 96 (D. 1927); Norfolk Southern HR. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546 (D.
1920).
30. Chicago v. North Western Ry. v. Continental Oil Co., 253 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.
1958).
31. 245 U.S. 563 (1918).
32. Mining Company v. Consolidated Mining Company, 102 U.S. 167 (1880) in con-
struing the Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 244 (1853) which was an act for the govern-
ing of public lands in California.
33. 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1585 (1872).
34. 18 Stat. 482 (1875), 43 U.S.C.A. § 934.
35. See Great No. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 274 (1942).
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In the Union Pacific grant3" Congress conveyed by section 2 "the
right of way through the public lands . . . for the construction of
said railroad and telegraph lines" and by section 3 granted every
alternate section of public land on each side of the railroad; and
provided that "all mineral lands shall be excluded from the opera-
tion of this act." The Supreme Court in United States v. Union
Pacific37 construed this grant to hold that the grant of the "right-of-
way" through the public lands did not convey to the railroad the
title to oil and gas deposits underlying the right-of-way, and the
railroad may not in any way dispose of such deposits. The Court
further pointed out that whatever rights may have been included in
the grant of the right-of-way, the mineral rights were excepted by
reasons of the provision in section 3 excepting "mineral lands,"
which they said extended to the entire act.
This mineral reservation policy was not clear until four years
after the Union Pacific grant when the Act of July 26, 1866,38 for-
mally prescribed the procedure for asserting control over the min-
eral lands.
These various grants did make stipulations that the railroads
could, in the course of construction, appropriate to their own use
material along the right-of-way. 39 This provision tended to cloud
the issue whether or not they were entitled to all of the minerals
found. It was argued that by virtue of the right to construction
materials, the railroads were also entitled to minerals. The Courts
uniformly discarded these contentions and continued to reserve the
mineral lands to the United States.4" It is apparent that the fed-
eral policy after 1875 was to specifically reserve all mineral rights
in land grants of the public domain to those that took by patent.
Actually, in 1864, Congress removed all doubt that mineral lands
are reserved from grants of the public domain by stating "No act
passed at the first session of the Thirty-eighth Congress granting
lands to states or corporations to and in the construction of roads, or
for other purposes or to extend the time of grants heretofore made,
shall be so construed as to embrace mineral lands, which in all
cases shall be and are reserved exclusively to the United States, un-
less otherwise specially provided in the act or acts making the
36. Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
37. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
38. 14 Stat..251 (1866).
39. The Union Pacific grants stipulated that "the right, power, and authority is hereby
given said company to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road, earth,
stone, timber, and other materials for the construction thereof." 12 Stat. 489 (1864).
40. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903); United States v. Denver &
Rio Grande Ry., 150 U.S. 1 (1893); Wright v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 175 Fed.
845 (8th Cir. 1910).
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grant."' 1 The Courts have construed this act strictly against the
Grantee. 42 The Courts have also construed the intent of Congress
to exclude all mineral lands, known or unknown, ' 3 and if the lands
were found to mineral the patent should be set aside.1 4 The rail-
roads were then entitled to indemnification if the lands were found
to be mineral, but if the railroad fraudulently indemnified the
original mineral lands by other mineral lands, the indemnified lands
were also subject to be set aside .5 This policy apparently covered
all other grants of the public domain, i. e., school lands.
4 6
Congress by no means intended to freeze the minerals underly-
ing the railroad grants after construction. Although they had no
right to the minerals, after the Act of May 21, 1930, the railroads
were free to develop the underlying minerals by lease from the
United States at a prescribed royalty. 4T
From 1849 to the present time, Congress has created a series of
acts expressly opening the mineral lands of the West to exploration,
"Taken collectively, they constitute a special code upon that subject
and show that they are intended not only to establish a particular
mode of disposing of mineral lands, but also to except and reserve
them from all other grants and modes of disposal where there is
no express provision for their inclusion. Thus the policy of dispos-
ing of mineral lands only under laws specially including them be-
came even more firmly established than before, and this is recog-
nized by the decisions.4"
Is this policy of Mineral Reservation inherent in the other modes
of conveyancing, by deed and condemnation? What interest then
did the railroads take by deed and what interest did they take if
land was acquired under emminent domain?
EFFECT OF WORDS SHOWING PURPOSE OF GRANT:
Generally, it may be said that a deed to a railroad company cover-
ing a right-of-way, but otherwise appearing to be an absolute con-
veyance , passes an easement only to the grantee, with the fee re-
41. 13 Stat. 567 (1864).
42. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Sand-
ers, 166 U.S. 620 (1894).
43. Barden v. Northern Pac. R.R., 154 U.S. 288 (1894).
44. Western Pac. R.R. v.,United States, 108 U.S. 510 (1882)
45. United States v. Southern Pac. R.R., 251 U.S. 1 (1919); the general rile is that
the question of mineral or non-mineral character of lands selected Ma entered shall be de-
termined as of the time when the selector or entryman fully complied with the conditions
precedent, except, where the land is confined to railroad land grants. The character of the
lands is determined as of the time when the patent issues, Wyoming v. United States, 255
U.S. 489 (1921).
46. Mining Co. v. Consolidated Mining Co., 102 U.S. 167 (1880).
47. Great No. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942) in construing the Act of
May 21, 1930, 46 Stat. 373 (1930).
48. United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918).
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maining in the grantor.4 9 It is only where the alternative to a fee
simple is a determinable fee, rather than an easement that the
former is held to be transferred. 0 A "right-of-way" in its legal and
generally accepted meaning in reference to a railroad company's
interest in land, is a mere easement for railroad purposes.51 The
quantum of the interest thus conveyed is limited to those uses
which are necessarily a proper incident in the maintenance and
operation of the railroad.
Language reading . . . I hereby grant, bargain, sell and quitclaim
unto the said New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company a
right-of-way for 200 feet, through the following land towit ... was
held to be an easement or a gift of user rather than a fee. -5 2 Also
where the deed read in Dart . .. has remised released and forever
quitclaimed, . . . unto said party of the second part . . . for the
purposes of Railroad right-of-way. Together with all singular
tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belong-
ing or inanywise appertaining and the reversion and reversions,
ramainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. The
court held not withstanding the language used that a mere ease-
ment was passed and not a fee. 53 Thus where a railroad is convey-
ed a "right-of-way" for "all the uses and purposes of said railroad
company so long as the same shall be used for the construction use
and occupation of said railroad company" conveyed an easement
only." In this connection a habendum clause, in accordance with
the general rule of construction, must yield to the granting clause,
although in fact there is no conflict between the two clauses where
the granting clause is for a railroad right-of-way and the habendum
clause has no such limitation, since the habendum clauses may be
interpreted as warranting the title to an easement which is granted
in perpetuity. Nor does the mere fact that a form of warranty
49. Flaten v. Moorhead, 51 Minn. 518, 53 N.W. 807 (1892); Highland Realty Co. v.
San Rafael, 46 Cal.2d 669, 298 P.2d 15 (1956); Lillard v. Southern Ry., 330 S.W.2d
335 (Tenn. 1959).
50. See Downer v. Rayburn, 214 Il. 342, 73 N.E. 364 (1905). As a practical matter
the few cases which have been decided on this point construe the grant as a fee simple
for purposes of alienation and a fee simple determinable for so long as the railroad is used
for railway purposes, see Reichard v. Chicago B. & R.R., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721
(1942); Epworth Assembly v. Ludington & N. By., 236 Mich. 565, 211 N.W. 99 (1926).
51. Green v. Kundel, 183 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). It would seem that
since the definition of "right-of-way" is indefinite, the inquiry in each case should be
determined from the language of the deed and the intent of the parties, University City v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. By., 347 Mo. 170, 149 S.W.2d 321 (1941).
52. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Morrison, 203 Miss. 387, 35 So.2d 68 (1948).
53. Byrd v. Goodman, 195 Ga. 621, 25 S.E.2d 34 (1944); Swan -v. O'Leary, 37
Wash.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Jackson v. Sorrells, 212 Ga. 333, 92 S.E.2d 513
(1956) (deed held to create a mere easement in railroad though purporting to be a fee).
54. Brown v. Weare, 152 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1941).
55. East Alabama R.R. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 (1885).
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deed is used necessarily resolve the question in favor of the grantee,
since the whole deed must be read in its entirety and the obvious
intent be given its operative effect." Language conveying to the
railroad a right-of-way through and over land and providing that
the railroad was to have and hold the land so long as it was re-
quired for railroad purposes, gave the railroad an "easement" and
not a "base fee". Consequently when the railroad abandoned the
right-of-way, the title to the land did not revert to the original
grantor, but resulted in the extinguishment of the easement so that
the land was owned in fee simple by the owner of the land on both
sides of the right-of-way.17
Most courts have been reluctant to find a greater estate then an
easement or railroad right-of-way; thus where the deed to the rail-
road company conveys a "right" rather than a strip, piece, parcel, or
tract of "land" (the right or privilege of constructing, operating or
maintaining a railroad) it must be construed as conveying an ease-
ment rather than a fee. This principle has been applied and recog-
nized in numerous decisions."8
On the other hand where the conveyance to the railroads, which
purport to grant and convey a strip, piece, parcel or tract of "land"
and which do not contain additional language relating to the use
or purpose to which the land is to be put or in other ways cutting
down or limiting directly or indirectly, the estate conveyed is
usually construed as passing an estate in fee.s9
The interest that passes becomes important usually in two ways:
(1) Where the railroad subsequently abandones the property t ' and
(2) when minerals are discovered underlying the railroad's right-
of-way."
A railroad company which has a mere right-of-way over lands
for railway purposes, is not privileged to drill thereon for oil and
gas as against the owner of the land from whom the right-of-way
56. Cleavland C. & St.L. Ry. v. Central Ill. Pub. Service Co., 380 Ill. 130, 43 N.E.2d
993 (1942); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Ellerbe, 199 La 489, 6 So.2d 556 (1942).
57. Fleck v. Universal Cyclops Steel Corp., 397 Pa. 648, 156 A.2d 832 (1959).
58. McClung v. Sewell Valley R.R., 97 W.Va. 685, 127 S.E. 53 (1924); Quinn v.
Pere Marquette R.R., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Lillard v. Southern R.R.,
330 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn. 1959).
59. Gilbert v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 185 Fed. 102 (8th Cir. 1911); Hale v. Davis, 170
Va. 68, 195 S.E. 52,3 (1938); Alabama & Vicksburg HR. v. Mashburn, 235 Miss. 346,
109 So.2d 533 (1959). The deed involved was absolute in form.
60. Southern Ry. v. Grifllitts, 304 S.W.2d 508 (Tenn. 1957).
61. Aubert v. St. Louis-San Francisco Hy., 251 P.2d 190 (Okla. 1953). The granting
clause of the deed conveyed "the right-of-way for a railroad, telegraph and telephone over,
through and across the lands of the grantor." There was nothing in the-deed indicating an
intent to convey a greater estate than an easement. It was held that the grantee received
only the right at the surface and the title to the oil and gas did not pass.
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was acquired.6 2  When a right-of-way is obtained the right so
acquired is generally held to be only applicable at the surface and
may be used only in the operation of the railroad.
Even though the title to the oil and gas remains in the person
from whom land is acquired, such person or successors in interest,
or the oil and gas lessee is not privileged to produce the oil and gas
from such right of way by drilling or operating wells thereon, if
such operations interfere with or endangers the safe and convenient
operation of the railroad.G Even where the abutting owner leases
his land for oil and gas the same rule will be applied as to bound-
aries as is ordinarily applied to conveyances of land along railroads
in absence of clear intention to the contrary, the lease will include
the right of way. While such lessee may not drill wells on the
right-of-way, he is, of course, privileged to take the oil and gas by
either directional drilling from the servient estate or from wells
vertically drilled on his own land. He may prevent such right of
way oil and gas from being taken by his lessor or the latter's assigns
or lessees."4 Nor can the railroad claim that the oil and gas whch
is found on the right-of-way be used in the maintenance and opera-
tion of the railroad and thus gain title indirectly."
Where the railroad ceases operation or in some way evidences
the intention to abandon the easement, the right-of-way reverts to
the owner of the servient tenant or his successors in interest."'
It is important to note that if the interest conveyed is a mere
"easement" the interest follows the servient tenement. Conversely,
if the interest so conveyed is defined as a fee on a special limita-
tion, 7 or a fee simple detminable,s the land will revert back to the
62. Midland Valley HR. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1928) cert. denied 280 U.S.
521 (1929); Jones v. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R., 214 Miss. 804, 59 So.2d 541
(1952) (The owner had obtained title to land by adverse possession adjacent to a rail-
road right-of-way. The court held that he acquired the fee to the center of the roadbed).
63. Midland Valley HR. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1928).
64. Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1928); Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Corn, 54 F.2d 766 (10th Cir. 1932).
,65. Chicago v. Northwestern Ry. v. Continental Oil Co., 253 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.
1958).
66. Where the servient estate in a strip of land is burdened with an easement for a
railroad right-of-way, it passes with a conveyance in fee to the abutting legal subdivision
or tract out of which it was carved without any express provision to the effect in the
instrument of conveyance. Upon abandonment of the easement the dominant estate becomes
extinguished and the entire title vests in the owner of the abutting tract. Sherman v.
Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105, 132 S.W.2d 768 (1939); Fitzgerald v. C:ty of Ard-
more, 281 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1960).
67. Nichols v. Haehn, 187 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
68. State Highway Comm. v. Jacob, 260 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953). Here the deed con-
veyed a right-of-way for railroad purposes over a strip of land, and provided that upon
abandonment the property thus conveyed should revert and be fully vested in the grantors,
or his assigns. The court held that the deed conveyed only an easement, and after aband-
onment relieved the servient estate of its burdon, and did not result in a reversion to the
grantor's heirs as remaindermen.
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original grantor or his heirs. This distinction should always be care-
fully observed in the cases involving abandonment.
One circumstance which would appear as a practical matter to
be of considerable weight in the determination of the question
whether a deed to a railroad company should be construed as con-
veying a fee or an easement is the amount of consideration. The
fact that the railroad company paid consideration equal or nearly
equal to the full market value of a fee title in land would thus show
an intention that the deed was to pass an estate in fee."s
In summary, it is possible to observe that: (a) where the words
of conveyance grant "land" (that is, contain language which in the
final analysis is stripped of its excessive verbage so often found in
real property deeds) which purport to grant a strip, parcel, or belt
of land will usually be treated as a fee, (b) those that grant a right,
license, right-of-way or other similar rights with the intent to cut
down or limit the interest are held to be an "easement" or right-
of-way. Where the land so held is classified as an easement, the
subsurface minerals belong to the abutting property owner and may
be extracted if it does not interfere with the railroad right-of-way
and upon the extinguishment of the "easement" the land reverts to
the land in which the interest was derived, unless the language of
the deed provided for other disposition of the property.
North Dakota has yet to consider this problem.7°
IV. LAND ACQUIRED BY EMINENT DOMAIN
The right of eminent domain is the paramount dominion of the
sovereign over his territory; but whether the power to appropriate
private property under the right rests upon an underlying title to
the soil or upon the sheer might of the ruler within his function of
public service is a debatable point. 1 Whichever theory is followed,
it is well settled that land may be appropriated by a railroad under
the law of eminent domain for any purpose which has a direct re-
lationship with the construction and maintenance of the railroad.
The quantum or interest of the estate passing to the railroad
under condemnation proceedings are either (a) an easement (b)
69. Sherman v. Sherman, 23 S.D. 486, 122 N.W. 439 (1909); Texas & P.R. Ry. v.
Martin, 123 Tex. 383, 71 S.W.2d 867 (1934) cert. denied 293 U.S. 598 (1934).
70. In at least one case the Supreme Court determined that a fee simple was conveyed
where a warranty deed was given. The deed in question did not attempt to limit or re-
strict the interest, but in form was absolute. State v. Rosenquist, 78 N.D. 671, 51 N.w.2d
767 (1952). In this connection, where nothing is said to the contrary there is a presump-
tion that fee simple has passed. N.D. Cent. Code § 47-10-13.
71. Kent's Commentaries, 424.
72. Lacy v. Montgomery, 181 Pa. Super. 640, 124 A.2d 492 (1956).
73. Hazek v. Greene, 51 N.J. Super. 545, 144 A.2d 199 (1958).
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a fee simple absolute74 or (c) a qualified fee.7 5 A few states have
recognized the "base fee" a technical term for the interest denoting
an estate having all the characteristics of a fee simple, but determ-
inable by the happening of an event. 
7
The general rule is that only an easement may be so taken unless
the taking of a greater estate is expressly authorized by law. 7 7 Con-
versely, it is well settled that a fee simple title may be acqured by
condemnation if the statute authorizing the taking so provides.
7
1
Where a railroad corporation acquires land under eminent do-
main and the authorizing statutes are silent as to the extent or
interest acquired there is a basic field of conflict." The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, 8° resolved this conflict by interpreting their
constitution to read "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation" to mean that the interest so acquir-
ed should be no greater than the use in which the taking was
granted. The court said there. "This is a recognition of a legislative
power to take private property for a public use, but is far from
giving authority to take such property for other than public uses.
When the state takes the property of its citizens for highway pur-
poses, it acquires an easement only, and it would seem that it is
empowered to take only so much of the title as is essential to the
public use. To take all the right, title and interest of an owner
obviously may be beyond such necessity and be a contradiction in
terms of the right to acquire an easement.
To- sustain the contention of the commission in this case would
open the door to wide and dangerous invasions of private property.
A power thus conferred would permit the acquisition of private
property for a public use with its ultimate destination intended to
be devoted to a private use and foreign to the cause for which it
74. Hamberger v. Hottinger, 14 Misc.2d 839, 180 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1958).
75. Lithgow v. Pearson, 25 Colo. App. 70, 135 Pac. 759 (1913) (This estate seems
peculiar to Colorado).
76. Smith v. Hall, 103 95, 72 N.W. 427 (1897); Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Penn.
R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904); In Reed v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 300, 199 AtI. 187
(1938) the court said ". . . defendant obtained title to its roadway by condemnation, such
title, while less than a fee, is more than an easement. It is a right to exclusive possession,
to fence in, to build over, the whole surface, . . . and to deal with it within the limits of
railroad uses, as absolutely and as uncontrolled as an owner in fee. There was no such
easement at common law . . . It would seem to be rather a fee in the surface, and so
much beneath as may be necessary for support . . .".
77. Hinman v. Barnes, 146 Ohio 497, 66 N.E.2d 911 (1946).
78. Hazek v. Green, 51 N.J.Super. 545, 144 A.2d 199 (1958).
79. "While it has been said that, if there is such a thing as a new title known to the
law, one founded on a taking by the right of eminent domain is as clear an example as
can be found." Holmes, J. in Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 184, 59 N.E.
763, 764 (1901); Quoted with approval in Crouch v. State, 218 App. Div. 356, 218 N.Y.
Supp. 173 (1926).
80. Summervill v. Hunt, 136 N.J.Misc. 314, 55 A.2d 833 (1947) construing the New
Jersey Const. Art. 1 § 16.
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was condemned." The reasoning applied here holds true where the
railroad instituted condemnation proceedings and pending the pro-
ceedings the railway purchased the interest by deed.8 '
The same analysis is applicable under special charter provisions
when a right-of-way is acquired by condemnation, only an easement
passes to the railroad. The original owner may then use the land
in any manner not inconsistent with the easement. However, such
occupancy and use by the owner is subject to the railroad's right to
extend its use of the right-of-way to its fullest extent whenever the
necessities of business require it.82
Where the land sought to be condemned by the railroad is sub-
ject to an oil and gas lease, the railroad has no right to drill for oil
and gas, but has only the exclusive use of the surface for railroad
purposes.8
In a recent South Dakota decision,8 4 where the statute authorized
the railroad to acquire real property for construction, maintenance
and operation of the railroad, neither the statute or the constitution
limited the degree of interest that could be acquired. The court
held that a fee simple rather than an easement was conveyed. The
conveyance was in the form of a warranty deed and made no ref-
erence to words of limitation, restricting or otherwise limiting the
interest of the grantee.
Where the charter or statutes are silent as to any prohibition
against taking the lands in fee simple, an easement is usually taken.
However, it is not necessary, in order for the railroad company to
acquire a fee simple that the charter or statute under which the
taking is made expressly declare that it shall do so.8 5 Even though
the statute authorizes the taking of a fee simple on condemning land
for a railroad right of way, the proceedings must clearly show that
it was intended that a fee title was to be acquired under the de-
cree.86
Where the statute does not authorize a taking in fee but the con-
demnation proceedings have nevertheless purported to transfer the
fee - the judgment will not be deemed wholly invalid but will be
81. Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael, 46 Cal.2d 175, 298 P.2d 15 (1956).
82. Carolina & Northwestern Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N.C. 695, 51
S.E.2d 301 (1949).
83. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 152 P.2d 367 (Okla.
1944) (Held that the railroad right of usage applied only to the surface).
84. Nystrom v. State, 104 N.W.2d 711 (S.D. 1960). Here the land was acquired by
purchase, rather then condemnation. The wording and form of the grant are such as to
make it clear that the plaintiff's intended to convey and the railroad company to acquire
a fee simple.
85. Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 348, 51 N.W.2d 245 (1952).
86. Mo. K. & T. R.R. v. Miley, 263 P.2d 415 (Okla. 1953).
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recognized as condeming an easement8 7 Similarly, where the stat-
ute authorizes a taking in fee but the constitution provides in effect
for the acquiring of an easement, the interest will not be considered
totally invalid but will convey the lesser estate.8
Today in North Dakota the question is still mute whether through
eminent domain a fee oi an easement is passed. Although at first
impression it would appear that North Dakota 9 would hold that a
fee simple is taken, it appears that the form of the conveyance and
the intention of the parties would be more controlling, plus the
factor of whether or not adequate consideration was given."°
The first qualification is that the property thus taken be for a
public purpose. 1  If the land so condemned is essential to the rail-
road for either the construction or maintenance of its business the
requirements of a taking for a public purpose are satisfied.92
Where the railroad receives the property by voluntary grant, the
statute reads ". .. the real estate received by voluntary grant
shall be held and used for the purposes of such grant only."' 3 The
implication is clear. The railroad takes only an easement for right-
of-way or railroad purposes and upon abandonment the easement
is extinguished. Since the railroad only acquires the right to the
surface it follows that the fee to the underlying minerals would
remain in the grantor. 4
The North Dakota Code also provides for the acquisition of
public lands through eminent domain. The right of way through
87. Crouch v. State, 218 App. Div. 356, 218 N.Y.Supp 173 (1926).
88. Scott v. St. Paul & C. R.R., 21 Minn. 322 (1875).
89. Interest has been expressed as to whether Wallentinson v. Williams County, 101
N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1960) would apply to railroads. There the State condemned land
for highway purposes. Subsequently, the former grantor brought an action to quiet title to
the oil, gas and minerals underlying the condemned land. The Supreme Court held that
prior to 1953 the state through condemnation took a "determinable fee" (really a fee
subject to the power of vacation) but that subsequent legislation revested the title to oil
and gas in the grantor by operation of law. In effect this decision is applicable only to the
state, and their political subdivisions in acquiring property for highway purposes under
eminent domain.
90. There appears to be an inconsistency between N.D. Cent. Code § 49-08-12(3)
and 32-15-03(2). In the former it appears from the wording of the statute that a fee
simple is taken from the language ". . . and to sell the same when not required for rail-
road uses and no longer necessary to its use." On the other hand the latter section in
specific terms apparently creates only alm easement. This statute reads "An easement when
taken for any other use. . . ." This is in reference to the classification of estates and
rights in land subject to be taken for public use. It would seem that the estate or interest
to be taken when not definitely set forth, would be only such as is reasonably necessary
to carry out a public purpose for which the land was taken. See, Wallentinson v. Williams
County supra, at 575.
91. Northern Pac. By. v. Boyton, 17 N.D. 203, 115 N.W. 679 (1908); N.D. Cent.
Code § 32-15-01.
92. See, N.D. Cent. Code § 49-08-13(3). (Purpose for which acquired).
93. N.D. Cent. Code § 49-08-13(2).
94. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Continental Oil Co., 253 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1958). This
decision envolved land granted by the' United States to the railroads and the same result
would probably follow if given by a private grantor.
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state land is subject to certain conditions95 both as to the quantum 96
which the railroad may take and to the duration.97 If the land
which is subject to be taken is university or school lands, the grant
".... shall contain an express reservation to the use of such cor-
poration of all lands which it shall have appropriated in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter. If such road shall not be com-
pleted across any such section within five years after the location
... . the rights herein granted shall be forfeited as to such
section."908
When land is actually condemned or by threat of eminent do-
main, a different situation appears. The North Dakota Century
Code § 49-08-12 (8) provides:
"To acquire by purchase or under the provisions of this
chapter on eminent domain, all such real estate and other prop-
erty as may be necessary for the construction, maintenance and
operation of its railroads, and stations, depot grounds, and
other accommodations reasonably necessary to accomplish the
objects of its incorporation to hold and use the same to lease
or otherwise dispose of any part or parcel thereof, and to sell
the same when not required for railroad uses and no longer
necessary to its use."
It is evident that the legislature intended that a fee simple title
should pass to the railroad. The title that is acquired is coextensive
and correlative with the power of holding and disposing of the land
thus acquired. This was the interpretation that the South Dakota
Court reached under an identical statute.99
However, the statute does not prohibit the parties in contracting
for a lessor estate by deed if they so desire. It would be a strained
interpretation indeed if the statute was absolute. Nor did the legis-
lature in its adoption intend to restrict or limit the freedom of con-
tract.' In any given case, if land is secured by eminent domain
by quite claim or warranty deed without restrictions, limitations, or
in any way cutting down or limiting the grant a fee simple should
95. N.D. Cent. Code § 49-09-01.
96. N.D. Cent. Code § 49-09-04.
97. N.D. Cent. Code § 49-09-03. (In effect this confers a determinable fee on a con-
dition subsequent).
98. N.D. Cent. Code § 49-08-12(3).
99. Nystrom v. State, 104 N.W.2d 711 (S.D. 1960). The court held that a fee simple
title passed notwithstanding a provision in the Constitution which said: "Private property
shall not he taken for public use, or damaged without just compensation as determined by
a jury. The fee of land taken for railroad tracts or other highways shall remain in the
owners, subject to the use for which it is taken.'" S.D. Const. Art. 6, § 13. North Da-
kota's Constitution is silent as to the quantum of the interest conveyed and merely asserts
that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation. ... N.D. Const. Art. 1 § 14.
100. It is not unreasonable to assume that the grantor may give not only an easement,
but a determinable fee ,or any other interest the parties agree upon.
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pass. On the other hand if the deed is restrictive in the sense that
the deed grants to the railroad only an easement or right-of-way
and the consideration is commensurate with the condemned land,
the grantee railroad should take only an easement.
Each taking should be scrutinized carefully in light of the appli-
cable statutes and judicial interpretations to determine in any given




THE DUTY OF AN AUTOMOBILE PASSENGER
TO EXERCISE CARE
What conduct on the part of a passenger in an automobile consti-
tutes contributory negligence barring a recovery in case of an acci-
dent? What affirmative steps must a passenger take for his safety?
This paper is an attempt to answer these questions in the light of
the changing technology of automotive travel. At the outset a few
definitions are in order.
Many states have enacted statutes limiting the liability of a driver
of an automobile for injuries to guests to situations involving either
gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intoxication.1 In such
jurisdictions a "guest" is defined, for the purpose of applying the
statutes, as a person whom the owner or possessor of a motor
vehicle invites to ride with him as a gratuity. 2 A "passenger", con-
versely, is defined as a person conveyed for hire from one place to
another, and the relationship between carrier and passenger is con-
tractual. 3
This latter definition is, for purposes of the present discussion,
somewhat too restrictive in character. It has been astutely ob-
served that whatever the technical legal significance of the term
"passenger" may be, in common parlance it means an occupant of
a motor vehicle other than the person operating it and describes a
physical status rather than a technical legal status.4 Many courts,
101. East Alabama Ry. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 (1885); Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S.
490 (1893); Rose v. Bryant, 251 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1952).
1. E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 39-15. For general discussion of these enactments, see
11 U. Cin. L. Rev. 24 (1937).
2. See Taylor v. Austin, 92 Ga.App. 104, 88 S.E.2d 192 (1955); Allison v. Ely, 159
N.E.2d 717, 722 (Ind. App. 1959).
3. Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935); Bentley v. Oldetyme
Distillers, 71 N.D. 52, 298 N.W. 417 (1941).
4. Vogrin v. Hedstrom. 220 F.2d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 1955).
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